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Abstract 
Metropolitan authorities and local business elites are often seen as major players in the energy 
transition in the city. Such energy transitions are mostly conceived of as low carbon technologies, 
which permit the retrofitting of urban infrastructure and the rebundling of metabolic circuits. This 
article contests these views by highlighting the major role of non-urban energy sector institutions 
and actors. By examining the connections between technology, space and energy politics , and by 
using a relational understanding of the urban, this article explores the case of Amman's energy 
transition. The growth of consumption coupled with new energy practices face a problematic 
supply because shifts in regional geopolitics prompted energy transition policies, among which 
are included a green growth program and the building of a nuclear power plant at the edge of the 
city. The article analyses the socio-political assemblages that shape those policies and unravel the 
competing interests at stake. It demonstrates the political and highly unruly nature of energy 
transitions. 
 
Mainstream discourses about urban energy transitions, mainly originating from international 
institutions or networks of cities, which presume a central role for urban authorities in the 
governance of energy transitions. The purpose of the article is to critically examine this claim, 
what can be termed as "city-centrism". It overstates the capabilities of the urban actors and 
institutions in elaborating a vision related to energy. I also maintain that it is necessary to 
investigate how actors in the energy sector (public institutions, utilities, consultants, international 
firms) conceptualize the urban in its materiality as well as in the complex and shifting set of 
social and political interests that constitutes it in the process of energy transitions with respect to 
other places and scales and in relation to various technologies. Given the diversity of interests at 
stake, an energy transition is a highly contested path. The restructuring of the energy circuits 
through the transition touches the spaces of life and the social interests of many citizens, 
prompting their involvement and fueling a debate on democracy in the city. 
Taking Amman as a case study to address that issue answers many critiques that energy transition 
scholarship has remained, until now, too focused on a specific set of cities: either World cities or 
Western cities (Droege, 2008; Hodson & Marvin, 2010a). It is necessary to expand analysis 
towards cities from the Global South and ordinary cities .. Two main features shared with many 
cities characterize Amman in relation to energy issues. Firstly, the city is experiencing strong 
demographic and economic growth, particularly fueled by regional migrations. New consumption 
practices   strongly sustain the very high pace of growth in energy demand. A second ordinary 
feature is in the energy insecurity. Amman's energy supply almost entirely relies upon 
hydrocarbons, in a country dependent upon imports from its neighbors for 98% of its needs 
(Mason, Al-Muhtaseb, & Al-Widyan, 2009). Thinking about the energy transition in Amman (like 
in most of the world) implies thinking about the geopolitics of oil, gas and nuclear energy. 
Alternative eco-friendly energy resources represent only a small part of the potential solution. 
Amman prompts the researcher to understand climate changes and global threats from a local 
point of view and from within the framework of local constraints which challenge the narratives 
of energy transition that focus mainly on low carbon transitions. 
The article begins by critically articulating technology choices, the 'urban' and issues in 
governance and politics in urban energy transitions. It then moves on to the analysis of Amman's 
thirst for electricity resulting from huge demographic and economic growth and the rise of a new 
urban way of life.  Urban energy supply is threatened today not only by the pace of growth,  
requiring strong investments, but also by various geopolitical issues underlining the dependence 
of the country upon external imports and leading to the adoption of a new energy transition 
strategy. Then, rather than focusing on institutions, I will focus on two distinct energy transition 
policies, and assess how they articulate with the urban. The first is led by the Greater Amman 
municipality, and it is called the Amman Green Growth Program, entailing several energy 
projects. The second is the project for developing Jordan's nuclear program , which is directly  
related to Amman's energy demand. In the final section, I will discuss these strategies in light of 
three topics: The governance of energy transitions, the technological orientation of urban energy 
transitions and the  potential for low carbon policies; and thirdly, energy transitions as an issue for 
urban politics
1
. 
Technology, Space and Politics in Urban Energy Transitions 
 
The recent acknowledgment, by both international and metropolitan institutions as well as by 
scholars , that cities have a central role to play in coping with climate change and energy 
challenges (OECD, 2010; Sassen, 2009; World Energy Council, 2010), has led to a blossoming of 
scholarly works scrutinizing urban strategies. According to Hodson and Marvin, such strategies 
fall into three categories: securing the strategic protection of world cities, building more self-
reliant urbanism, and developing new networks of global agglomerations, like the C40 (Hodson 
& Marvin, 2010b). However, many of those studies have investigated pioneer programs or world 
cities which have shown a particular awareness vis-à-vis such issues and which have expressed a 
strong will to act in that field (for instance: Bulkeley, Castan-Broto, Hodson, & Marvin, 2010a). 
Therefore, there is a need to focus on more ordinary cities, specifically from the Global South. 
In so doing, the purpose is not to compare the programs in such cities to alleged pioneer 
strategies, and to highlight the path more modest cities should follow. One of the main purposes 
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 The information about Jordanian urban and energy policies was gathered during three trips  
between 2008 and 2010 over a total of six weeks. The field work consisted of interviews with 54 
stakeholders (some of them more than once) in ministries, energy utilities, municipalities, foreign 
institutions and NGOs (a few of which were conducted in Arabic), as well with local scholars. In addition, I 
carried out a review of the documentation in several libraries, as well as a survey of the press and of a 
number of websites.  Newspapers and blogs have helped me follow up on recent shifts in  Jordanian affairs 
and specifically on the debate about the nuclear project. 
 
of this article is to see if cities, understood as "particular coalitions of social interests (urban 
political, policy and business elites and decisions makers and, to a lesser extent, including NGO's 
and environmental justice groups)" (Hodson & Marvin, 2010b), really lead the move toward an 
energy transition. In contrast to world cities featured in international reports on city and energy 
best practices, it is interesting to consider if, in most parts of the world, the institutional 
framework of the energy sector makes any room for 'cities' at all.  Rather than  oppose urban and 
extra-urban actors, and in adherence to a more relational conception of the urban, I would like to 
make the case for a broader definition of the 'urban' which takes into account energy sector actors 
from the national level but whose actions take place in, or have an influence on the 'urban' level. 
The need to make room for the visions, interests and priorities of energy utilities and firms has 
already been recognized (Hodson & Marvin, 2010b) but this element must be stressed in order to 
properly orient the research. The idea is to analyze the energy (transition) strategies of such actors 
and institutions, and how they conceptualize the urban, both as a material, localized entity in 
relation to other places, and as a social and political assemblage, where the relations of political 
elites,  firms and  inhabitants interplay. 
The framework is derived from the existing literature dealing with energy transition, and it 
distinguishes between two levels. The first level relates to technology and space. Urban energy 
transition policies involve a reconceptualization of energy production and consumption in relation 
to urban spaces. Several studies have attempted to delineate typologies of energy transition 
policies with reference to certain technologies. Coutard and Rutherford distinguish between 
autarky-oriented (off-grid) and autonomy-oriented strategies (feed-in to grid or loop closing) 
intended to  restructure  energy circuits(Coutard & Rutherford, 2010). As for Marvin and Hodson 
(2010a), they identify several strategies oriented toward the construction of "new urban 
networked technologies". Their approach more directly emphasize the re-localization or 
downscaling of energy circuits.  This involves the (partial) retreat of large scale energy networks 
(oil-based) and the building of new, closer infrastructures which help cities to gain independence 
from resources which the peak oil, military threat or climate change may make more expensive or 
vulnerable, etc. This is also a way of cutting transportation costs. In short, urban energy transition 
strategies  downsize energy circuits and re-center them on the city itself. They limit, as much as 
possible, dependence upon remote places. 
In using such a characterization of energy technologies in their relation to the urban, one must 
add one question. To what extent are urban energy transitions low-carbon transitions? Most of the 
above-mentioned literature indeed seems to adhere to such a postulate. Here, I will examine the 
role of classical hydrocarbon energy solutions (in electricity generation – the issue of urban 
transportation will remain out of the scope of this study) and of nuclear energy in urban energy 
transitions. 
The second level of analysis is about governance and politics in energy transitions. Diverse 
policy-networks interplay in the making of energy policies. Some of them are city-based interests. 
The inclusion of energy issues in their strategies is quite new, which explains why they are the 
focus of scholars like Hodson and Marvin, who have stressed that such coalitions try to articulate 
original responses to 'new pressures' related to climate change and energy challenges. The 
question here is: To which extent do such networks also operate in 'ordinary cities' (Robinson, 
2006)? However it is also necessary to understand how networks typically involved in energy 
policies adjust to such pressures. By 'typical' networks of energy governance,  the State apparatus 
is meant (Ministry of Energy and other government institutions in the sector), as well as the 
energy utilities and firms, some of them being national and sometimes public, some of them 
being multinational, and exploiting certain resources or technologies in certain countries or cities. 
Since the urban (and particularly the biggest cities) accounts for a strong share in  energy 
consumption, securing its supply and managing its demand becomes a major issue for such 
actors. Urban energy transitions, therefore, are not solely the problem of metropolitan institutions 
but more likely a multilevel and public/private issue. Rather than being bound to administrative 
levels and  specific places, the governance of energy issues relies on coalitions and connections of 
interests cutting through scales and public/private borders. 
The depiction of such policy-networks in terms of neoliberal assemblages is particularly useful. 
According to Parker, neoliberal assemblages point to the "efforts to bring private agencies and 
market-oriented solutions to bear on traditional problems of government (e.g., economic and 
social development, distribution of public goods and services, maintenance of the commons, 
security, etc)." (Parker, 2009, p.110.). Indeed, in many countries, energy and electricity sectors 
have experienced in recent years neoliberal reforms, and have been opened for investments 
channeled through global networks, like multinational energy firms. Such transformations shape 
new power relations and social hierarchies which can be observed in the cityscape, for instance in 
new highlighted buildings or air-conditioned malls. It can also be observed in remote places, 
where power plants or electricity circuits are implanted, or energy-driven mega-projects are 
planned. Socio-political assemblages are not reducible to one place or one level, and involve a 
relational conception of the urban. 
The notion of urban metabolism is helpful here in linking the two levels of analysis. Analyzing 
the city through the material flows of natural resources means acknowledging the connections 
between various places, in and beyond the city (Swyngedouw, 2006). It is another way of 
recognizing the relational nature of the urban. However, Swyngedouw also tells us that the flows 
of nature involved in urban metabolism are shaped by networks of power which in turn are 
reconfigured when urban metabolism experiences changes. Energy transition in the city implies 
de/reconnections of several local and remote places, and involves the mobilization of actor 
networks potentially transcending the urban level, but whose decisions transform the city. The 
political conflicts related to the building, management and transformation of urban energy circuits 
are inherent elements in the analysis of urban energy transitions. 
The interest in the notion of assemblage is , as Parker shows, that such connections of interests 
are dynamic and experience frequent and contentious transformations which can reveal "cracks" 
in political order and threats to it, given the contradictions of interests between  various 
stakeholders in the energy sector or due to unexpected political changes. Paying attention to street 
politics in relation to energy concerns points to the fundamentally non-technical character of 
energy transitions and even to their disruptive potential for the political order. 
The thirst for Electricity and the Rise of Energy Insecurity 
This section presents the growing demand for electricity in the city of Amman and analyses how 
it has been sustained. The focus is put on physical and social connections which enables the urban 
experience of Amman, as well as on daily consumption practices which take place and which 
shape social hierarchies in the cityscape. It also highlights the recent emergence of a concern for 
energy security in the wake of geopolitical changes. 
Amman, the capital city of Jordan, has about 2 million inhabitants. With the adjacent and 
surrounding cities of Zarqa, Salt and several other places, it forms a metropolitan area of about 
3,5 million people (about 60% of Jordan's population). The very high population growth  results 
from regional migrations (Palestinians in 1948 and 1967, refugees from Kuwait in 1991, Iraqis in 
the 2000's) who give the city a cosmopolitan profile. The perimeter of JEPCO (Jordan Electric 
Power Company), the regional company supplying Amman and its satellites, supplies about 65% 
of the electricity in Jordan (see table 1& figure 1). The figures of electricity consumption should 
even be higher, since a significant part of the electricity consumed in areas served by EDCO 
(Electricity Distribution Company), a electricity utility outside Amman, is used by  water pumps 
that carry  water up from the Jordan Valley (from -400 m up to 1200 m) and from other sources 
far from the city. In JEPCO’s perimeter, the growth of electricity consumption has been faster 
than in other areas during the last years, at about 12% for 2004-2009.  
Table 1 : Electricity Consumption by Regional Utility and Sectors in 2007-2009 
Figure 1 : Electric Districts and Main Projects in Jordan 
 This is the result of population growth and of the increase in standards of living
2
 , and of the 
adoption of new social practices. In recent decades, Jordan has experienced a major increase in 
the use of electricity in daily life. The proportion of the urban population with access to the public 
electricity network has increased from 78% in 1979 to 100% in 2009
3
. In the meantime, the urban 
population has increased from 1.5 million to 4.9 million, mostly concentrated in the central 
region. It is not surprising that the national policy of universal access to electricity has also led to 
the widespread use of electrical domestic appliances. For instance, between 2000 and 2007, the 
use of refrigerators and washing machines in homes increased from 89% to 97%.  
This growing use is mainly related to the urban way of life, in its social and economic 
dimensions. At the national level, residential and commercial sectors have been the major 
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 Jordan belongs to the lower-middle income category with respect to per capita GDP ($2461 per 
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3 Source: Jordan Department of Statistics, Jordan in Figures, www.dos.gov.jo.  
contributors to growth. Between 1997 and 2007, their respective consumption increased from 
31% and 11% respectively to 36% and 16% of total electricity consumption, while that of 
industry decreased from 34% to 29%
4
. In JEPCO's area, one can notice that economic activities 
represent a bigger share of the demand than in other areas, reflecting the concentration of 
economic activity in the capital (table 1). Some practices are particularly involved in growth. 
Firstly, and as is true in most Middle Eastern and emerging countries, air conditioning is 
spreading at a very high pace: 7% of households had A/C in 2006, compared with 4.9% in 2000. 
Another very strong indicator of the demand for A/C is the summer peak in demand for electricity 
(the peak demand growths at a rate of more than 12% yearly, which is a new phenomenon which 
the managers of the electric system have to face. In winter, electric heating is also on the rise, 
affecting 13.3% of households, and  as high as 16% in cities
5
. The development of these new 
electrical devices is clearly linked to social differentiation inside the city of Amman.. The high 
reliance on electricity  also enables new practices associated with social distinction, like  air-
conditioned malls which are emerging as new landmarks in the cityscape of West Amman as 
leisure facilities (Daher, 2008; Parker, 2009; Schwedler, 2010). 
As a result of the growing demand for electricity, in 2010 and 2011 Jordan experienced several 
summer outages, whereas such problems had never occurred since the beginning of the 1980s. 
Such disruptions point to the fact that securing Amman's supply is more and more difficult. 
Though the country has almost no proper energy resources and imports up to 98% of its energy 
needs, Jordan – and first of all Amman –have long quenched their thirst thanks to privileged and 
cheap access to oil and more recently natural gas from  neighboring Arab countries. Until 2003, 
trade agreements with Iraq guaranteed the supply of cheap oil, which enabled the Jordanian 
national utility to sell electricity cheaply. The end of privileged access to oil began after the 
regime change in Iraq, and exposed Jordan to world market oil prices (World Bank, 2005). The 
country has now entered into a new era, which the government has acknowledged as an "energy 
insecurity scenario" (Mason et al., 2009). As a result, Jordan revised its energy strategy and 
switched most of its power plants from oil to natural gas (80% of electricity generation is now 
based on gas
6
). Jordan signed an agreement with Egypt for the supply of natural gas at a fixed 
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 Communiqué from NEPCO, 12/1/2009. 
6
price until 2022, at a cost estimated at one third of the market price. Nevertheless, Jordan’s 
energy bill rose from 1,153 to 2,280 million Jordanian Dinars (JD)
7
 between 2004 and 2008. 
Fearing popular unrest, the government did not fully pass the price increase on  electricity , and 
raised  subsidies to maintain  prices at a time when the global economic slump had already badly 
impacted  public debt. 
In 2011, in the wake of the Egyptian revolution, the delivery of natural gas experienced major 
difficulties, increasing  insecurity for supply and leading to what is now described as a profound 
energy crisis and an "issue of national security of Jordan"(The Jordan Times, 1/20/2012). More 
than 10 'terrorist attacks' blasted the pipeline pumping gas from Egypt to Israel and Jordan 
between February and December 2011, forcing  Jordanian power plants to rely on heavy oil fuel 
with  overspending at 1 billion JD for the year. In the meantime, the Egyptian government also 
imposed a new agreement on gas supply, ending the favorable price structure and limiting the 
amount of gas delivered. 
The energy insecurity issue led national authorities to design a strategy for energy transition as 
soon as 2005. To this end, the government has embarked on an ambitious policy to develop 
renewable energy power plants and oil shale mining, and plans for a nuclear plant are also under 
discussion. The purpose of the Royal Energy Strategy - made public in 2005 and updated in 2007 
- is to meet the growing demand for electricity while facing budgetary and geo-strategic 
constraints. Climate change, global environment and peak oil arguments are not absent from the 
document but they are clearly secondary concerns. The Jordanian transition strategy includes a 
move towards renewable energy sources (wind and solar energy) as well energy efficiency gains 
that must save funds in energy generation. Renewable energy resources should represent 10% of 
the supply in 2020, while energy efficiency gains should represent 20% of the current demand. 
However, the main resources targeted are natural gas, oil shale (with the goal of meeting 14% of 
total energy needs in 2020), which is locally abundant and considered very promising, and 
nuclear power (to meet 6% of total energy needs in 2020) (Mason et al., 2009). An essential 
concern is also in securing new suppliers for natural gas  in order not to be held hostage by the 
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troubled relationship between Egypt and Israel. The Jordanian energy transition strategy is far 
from being a low-carbon transition and its main objective is to secure its supply in complex 
regional geopolitics.  
In the following section some of the policies aiming at implementing these technological projects 
are reviewed, highlighting  competing coalitions of interests that promote the policies and their 
links to the urban. Most of the projects featured in the Royal Energy Strategy are intended to 
supply a major part of their energy to Amman. Some of them are, or will be, built very near to the 
capital city (fig. 1). Nevertheless, they are largely conceptualized as national projects, being 
thought of at national scale, and their relation to the city as a material entity or as a network of 
social and political interests has neither been disclosed nor contested. In contrast to that, in the 
following cases, direct connections to the urban can be made: In the first case, the use of low-
carbon technologies makes it possible to exploit diffuse energy in the city or to help customers to 
save energy; in the other case, the project for a nuclear power plant finds its justification in its 
proximity to the city, which is an original and paradoxical form of downscaling circuits. Both 
projects offer very interesting elements to analyze what is at stake in the urban energy transition. 
The Amman Green Growth Strategy 
 
The Royal Energy Strategy has mainly focused on the future energy mix but has almost failed to 
mention the role cities and citizens can play, apart from a few lines dealing with energy savings 
and energy efficiency, for instance linked to incentives for solar panel heaters. In contrast to that, 
the Greater Amman Municipality has designed an ambitious and original "Green Growth" 
strategy. It reveals the awareness of the municipal leadership (the mayor and experts surrounding 
him) regarding threats to city electricity supply. The initiative is also consistent with the 
neoliberal agenda pushed by various local, national and international interests, which aim at the 
transformation of Amman into a new real estate and finance hub. 
In 2010, the GAM launched the Amman Green Growth Program (AGGP) which encompasses 
some ongoing projects already approved in the framework of the 2008 Metropolitan Strategy 
(Compact Growth, public transportation) and new components related to sustainable development 
(solid waste management, an energy saving lightning program, recycling of used water). This 
move bore the imprint of the new Mayor Omar Maani and highlighted its will to smooth out the 
image of Amman to a city open for international (and specifically Iraqi and Gulf countries) real 
estate speculation by emphasizing sustainable development goals. 
Two components of the master plan illustrate the emergence of local energy policies. The first is a 
large project to replace existing incandescent lamps by low-consumption bulbs. The target is to 
replace 50% of street light bulbs s within three years, and to replace them in homes 
(approximately 200,000 households) within five years. This project accompanies another energy-
saving project, whose aim is to equip 40% of households with solar water heaters (SWH). 
The second component concerning energy policy is the building and management of a waste 
treatment site in Al-Ghabawi, where a methanization unit is coupled to a 20 MW power station . 
The government has presented the project as part of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
Additionnal funding is to be provided by the World Bank and GAM.. This project is in line with a 
previous achievement which had been launched in 1997, that entailed the building and operating 
of a 1 MW Biogas unit in Al Ruseifah. The unit was operated by Jordan Biogaz Company, a 
subsidiary of GAM and of CEGCO, the public power generating company. The funding for the 
project was provided by the UNDP and the Global Energy Fund. Although there were a number 
of technical and administrative problems, among which the lack of (or delay in) legislative 
measures devoted to the replication of such biogas projects, the evaluators judged that the benefit 
of this pilot operation lay in the experience and expertise acquired by GAM (Rijs and al., 2007). 
Both projects are clearly intended to increase the Jordanian capital's energy autonomy and self-
reliance by retrofitting urban infrastructure (introduction of solar water heating and lightning) and 
rebundling urban metabolism (electricity generation from waste). The coalition of interests 
supporting that policy reveals a clear continuity with previous reforms and plans aiming at 
turning Amman into a showcase of urban renewal, and at fostering its role as a regional business 
center. As such, it very well fits the idea of a neoliberal assemblage, connecting various interests 
through different administrative scales and beyond public-private limits (Parker, 2009).  
During the 2000’s and specifically after 2006, several reforms have reinforced the Greater 
Amman Municipality and its Mayor (Malkawi, 2002; Potter, Darmame, Barham, & Nortcliff, 
2009). AGGP and the Metropolitan Strategy have been contracted  toa Canadian consulting firm 
(planningAlliance), which later helped set up a permanent local consulting body, the Amman 
Institute for urban development. This institute is a not-for-profit and independent institution led, 
until recently, by a Canadian planner but it is located in the town hall and its Board of Directors is 
directed by the Mayor. The Amman Institute provides consultations and training for the GAM as 
well as for other Jordanian (and now foreign) public institutions (Beauregard & Marpillero-
Colomina, 2011). The Amman Institute has been a key element in a strategy that can be seen as 
the result of an active politics of scale (Bulkeley, 2005), linking interests cutting through 
metropolitan, governmental and international levels and through the public/private limit. Indeed, 
several government agencies are connected to that network, like the Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency in the ministry of Energy, and the National Energy Research Centre. But the 
AGGP was also partly inspired by the World Bank as part of a global strategy  called the City 
Wide Strategy. It aims at promoting Amman as a pilot city in the Middle East and North African 
Region
8
. At the time of the fieldwork, all the details of the AGGP funding were not confirmed but 
several international institutions, in addition to the WB, were keen to help, for instance AFD, the 
French aid agency for public lighting, and the UNDP for a waste power plant. In addition to the 
help provided by these institutions, the GAM has actively built connections with international 
networks of cities in order to gain experience from others' projects and to attract investment and 
new expertise to the city (Parker, 2009). 
The way the projects are currently devised also links them very clearly to the commercial 
approach to sustainable development understood as ecological modernization (Hajer, 1996; 
Myllylä & Kuvaja, 2005). Several private firms (ESCOs or other small energy contractors) and 
consultants are expecting profits from the new projects. Indeed, the GAM is currently exploring 
the idea of associating itself to the private sector in the implementation of lighting and SWH 
projects. These devices would be financed through monthly subscriptions to a commercial service 
and private firms would provide investment and maintenance.  
However, several key legal decisions intended to promote renewable energy and energy saving 
are currently on hold, like the GEREEF
9
, due to the repeated suspension of the Parliament. This 
could reflect the hesitations of several interests inside the government as well as in the energy 
sector vis-à-vis the renewable energy strategy, in contrast to the nuclear project that seems to 
enjoy a stronger support. 
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 The Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund should help finance the investments in 
sustainable technologies, mostly with foreign funding.  
The City and the Nuclear Plant 
 
The second case study in the Jordanian energy transition is a project to build a nuclear power 
plant. Though still in the complex process of designing and bidding, it has recently gone through 
major changes which have underlined its very strong connections with the urban, and have fueled 
unexpected public debates calling into question the energy future of Jordan, and which gain 
importance given the context of the Arab uprising. . 
The King of Jordan and the Jordanian government have made it clear since 2007 that they want to 
develop a nuclear program with a capacity of 1000 MW in 2020, accounting for 6% of the 
country's energy, and 20% in 2030. The aim is to secure Jordan's electrical independence and 
even to turn the country into an electricity exporter. The project has been directly managed by the 
King, who has created a special body for the nuclear program, the Jordanian Nuclear Atomic 
Commission. Its head since its creation has been Khaled Toukan, a nuclear scientist who has 
occupied several ministerial positions since 2005, including the ministry of Energy (in 2011). The 
interesting point is how such institutions with very technological concerns have integrated the 
urban into their discourse regarding the implementation of the energy transition. With the support 
of international consultants, they first selected Aqaba as the site for building the nuclear power 
plant. Several technological reasons were cited in justifying that choice: the need to pump cooling 
water from the nearby sea, and the closeness of two big infrastructural projects, which include a 
water desalination plant and the projected Red Sea-Dead Sea channel currently under study. The 
first infrastructural project aims at responding to a growing fresh water demand in a country 
suffering from aridity and water scarcity – beginning with Amman (Potter and Darmame 2010). 
The Red-Dead project aims at compensating for the loss of water in the Dead Sea, which lowers 1 
meter per year and threatens the very existence of the salted sea and the economic activities 
linked to it. Both projects would require great quantities of electricity. 
However, at the end of 2010, the government announced that a new site was now under study, 
Balaama, near Mafraq, 35 km north-east of Amman (figure 1), at the desert's limits. Several 
reasons were alleged to justify that move. A first one was the seismicity of the Gulf of Aqaba, 
which could threaten the nuclear plant. Such an argument resonated even more strongly in the 
aftermaths of the Fukushima collapse. Yet the move also seems to be related to geopolitical 
friction between Jordan and its neighbors. In the summer and the autumn 2010, the USA 
ambassador conveyed concern regarding the security of the program and the risk of nuclear 
proliferation. His step was also regarded as motivated by the Israeli fears of a terrorist attack 
against the nuclear site that could touch Israeli areas adjacent to the border. The press also 
mentioned that such fears could be shared by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, also next to the site. These 
elements point to the fact that (urban) energy transitions cannot be separated from  geopolitical 
contexts and that it is shaped by relations of power. 
 Other arguments were also put forward to justify the move to Mafraq. They highlight that the 
nuclear project is, in the eyes of the authorities, entirely part of Amman's metabolism. A first 
argument is that building a nuclear site near Amman would spare the building of a 400 km high 
voltage line from Aqaba to Amman. This shows that the capital would be the main place of 
consumption for the electricity generated by nuclear power plant. This argument echoes the 
concern for relocalizing energy production and downscaling the energy circuits (Hodson & 
Marvin, 2010a). The second argument is that Amman's waste waters would be recycled in order 
to ensure cooling the nuclear plant to be built in Mafraq. Such technological means already exist 
in Palo Verde, Arizona, the authorities say. It is striking that this rationale re-conceptualizes the 
flows of energy and water involved in the nuclear power plant in the manner which is close to the 
way rebundled networks play in the sustainable city agenda (Coutard & Rutherford, 2010). Far 
from being a project thought out for, and connected to the national grid, the nuclear project 
appears as being rebundled to the city's energy and hydraulic infrastructural networks therefore it 
is part of the urban metabolism. This example clearly shows that the urban energy transition is not 
only about developing energy efficiency solutions at the city scale or engaging in low carbon 
electricity generation to quench Amman's energy thirst, but is centrally related to the nuclear 
option. 
What is the particular coalition of interests that promote the nuclear program and to what extent 
can one identify intersections or conflicts with urban interests (including the groups that push for 
the Green Growth Program)? As can be expected, investigating the political and economic 
interests revolving around the nuclear issue is not easy. Yet the Fukushima catastrophe has 
spurred hesitations within the Jordanian government about the nuclear program and has opened 
up a space for public debate during which much information has been leaked to the press
10
. 
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 During my last field trip, several interviewees opposed to the nuclear program had mentioned 
their difficulties in capturing  public attention  and at the time, very little information had surfaced in the 
press. 
 
Such a program has been strongly promoted and defended by the King himself as an issue of 
national independence and a sovereign right. However the program has also received the support 
of several institutions and interests outside Jordan. The program is closely monitored by  
international institutions like the International Nuclear Agency, which have on many occasions 
given positive reports
11
. Several foreign governments have praised the Jordanian project, 
specifically those from which firms were involved in nuclear development originate. Three 
international vendors have been chosen (French-Japanese
12
, Canadian and Russian) and their 
financial, technological and spatial offers are still under study. Such a coalition is very different 
from the one led by the Greater Amman Municipality and apparently has no connection to it. Yet 
it can also be understood as a neoliberal assemblage since private international interests intersect 
those of several Jordanian institutions and political actors. That example highlights that the 
geopolitical dimension is key to most urban energy transition projects. 
Taking to the Streets against the Energy Transition 
 
These two examples of policies aiming at tackling Amman's energy transition have shown the 
intertwining of technological issues with a concern for the city as a space, with its materiality, its 
metabolism and its connections with various and remote spaces. These entail geopolitical 
conflicts  which in turn weigh on the definition of urban energy transition policies. The political 
processes which have been unraveled here pertain to urban governance or to geopolitics. 
However the urban energy transition also prompts other types of conflicts, involving urban 
citizens, which is the aim of the following section. 
The first contentious issue is the price of electricity, which is theoretically the responsibility of the 
Electricity Regulatory Committee, an independent body created in the wake of the liberalization 
of the electricity sector in 2001, and taking effect in 2005. One of the axes of that policy has been 
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http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/0927_middle_east_nuclear_ebinger_banks.aspx. 
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 The French AREVA has already been awarded the exploitation of uranium mines. 
 
the removal of the tariff subsidies which were very high, given the low cost of hydrocarbon 
supply until early 2000. Given the rise of the international oil and gas prices, raising the price has 
become a central issue after 2008 and both NEPCO (National Electric Power Company), the 
national utility acting as the single buyer in the electricity sector
13
, and the Electricity Regulatory 
Committee have claimed it necessary to adopt a mechanism to link the fuel cost to the electricity 
tariff. Yet the ERC and the Ministry of Energy also argue the renewable project would also justify 
a price hike. Indeed, the selling price proposed by bidders for renewable power plants (wind and 
solar) are much higher than current prices, and a major reason for the delayed implementation is 
the discrepancies in prices.  
Several hikes have been decided, in 2008 or very recently, in 2012. Yet it is a contentious and 
very unpopular issue, in a context of rising commodity prices and diminishing incomes for many 
citizens in the country. In September 2009, a long-announced hike had been suspended after a 
personal and public intervention by the King. When implemented, the hikes have been calibrated 
in order to weigh more on big consumers, assumed to be the wealthiest people, and to leave 
ordinary citizens unaffected. Nevertheless, the demonstrations that have taken place in recent 
months show that the issue of pricing, itself directly a consequence of the energy transition policy, 
remains very sensitive for the government. 
The protests against the nuclear project are amplifying the issue of pricing. In the wake of 
Fukushima and in conjunction to the uprisings in the Arab world
14
, several opponent groups have 
gained momentum and staged various public demonstrations. The most visible have been 
environmentalist NGOs like Greenpeace Jordan, which spectacularly demonstrated in front of the 
Ministry of Energy, but also local NGOs like the Jordan Renewable Energy Society (JRES). On 
one hand, these NGOs claim the nuclear projects are dangerous, specifically in Jordan because of 
the seismic environment (even in the Balaama site) and because of water scarcity. They also 
attack the lack of local expertise and the opacity of the negotiations and the decisions in a country 
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 This utility bears directly the differences between the generation cost and the selling cost, and its 
budget has recorded huge deficits in recent years due to that discrepancy. 
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 The Arab uprisings have resulted, in Jordan, in mounting criticism against the government, the 
corruption and standards of life. In the face of protest, the government lead by Samir Rifai, a man directly 
involved in the privatization of the electricity sector, resigned in January 2011. Another Prime Minister, 
Marouf Bakhit, also resigned in September 2011. 
 
generally lacking in transparency. At last, the cost of the nuclear program is an issue for them. On 
the other hand, they promote the development of wind and solar energy, because according to 
them Jordan has a huge potential for it. These NGOs intersect with the coalition of interests 
involved in the low carbon energy transition in Amman. For instance, the head of JRES is also a 
consultant and firm-owner selling solar panels and promoting alternative technologies
15
. Some 
high-ranking civil servants in the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Energy also 
publicly criticized the nuclear program and were recently joined by a Princess from the Royal 
Family, Basma Bint Ali, and even a former head of the Nuclear Energy Commission. These 
critics and counter-proposals were aired during a public conference in Amman. A debate on the 
issue later took place in Parliament and the Muslim Brotherhood, a strong opposition movement, 
took a stance against the program (Luck, 2011b). 
In addition to the mobilization of these expert or political groups reaching into the heart of the 
administration, one has to count a popular movement in the Balaama area . Inhabitants, militants 
and local tribal leaders created a movement called Irhamuna ("Mercy for us") that seems to gather 
together hundreds if not thousands of people. They reject the project in the name of security 
concerns, deeming the nuclear plant too close to their homes and taking land belonging to their 
tribes. They also criticize the lack of public participation (Luck, 2011a). Several connections are 
to be found between this local mobilization and the more middle-class group of ecologists which 
have been active in the media and on the web. 
The emergence of popular mobilization against some of the crucial options for the energy 
transition, and against their financial consequences, underlines that politics is a central dimension 
of energy transitions, often overlooked in many accounts and in theorization. While (urban) 
energy transitions are conceptualized as a techno-policy driven process, recent popular protests 
show that even in the absence of a democratic and open process of information and decision, the 
technocratic issue of energy transition may become a political issue, as it concerns the interests of 
the citizens – the cleanliness and security of their built environment and their standard of living. 
Two factors contribute to that transformation.  
The first is linked to the conjuncture that the unexpected burst of protests in Arab countries has 
also spurred a wave of protests against the regime, the lack of democracy and transparency, which 
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in turn has touched energy projects. The Fukushima catastrophe is the second factor, and it is 
interesting to note how opponents to nuclear projects have domesticated the image of apocalypse, 
comparing an eventual future nuclear power plant collapse to the Nakba, the expelling of 
Palestinians from their land by the Israelis in 1948 – a foundational episode in the creation of 
modern Jordan (Taylor, 2011b). In doing so, they subvert and properly reverse the rhetoric of 
doom usually associated with environmental politics as "post-political", ie. consensual techno-
managerial solutions designed to escape a threat, for instance the future lack of energy 
(Swyngedouw, 2009). The street encounters of these diverse groups of interests 
(environmentalists and Balaama citizens) have not resulted in a revolution and probably will not, 
but they have derailed the "post-political" management style of energy policies and transformed 
them into political issues. What is at stake now is not only a national energy crisis but a debate to 
decide who will pay, which citizens will have to live near a nuclear plant, and how can such 
issues be decided democratically. The energy transition issue in Amman has become an open 
political problem, consistently with recent scholarship (H. Bulkeley, Castan Broto, et al., 2010). 
Conclusion 
 
There are several conclusions which have been revealed by this case study on energy transition 
policies in Amman or as related to that city.  These conclusions help understand anew the 
relationship between the urban and the issue of energy transitions. In this article, it has been 
clearly shown that changing social practices in the city represent a major push for energy 
transitions. However, the framework through which energy threats are understood is always a 
particular geographical construction, involving context-based relationships between the city, its 
country and its regional environment. Energy transitions are deeply inscribed in, and dependent 
upon a given geography of energy circuits and the geopolitical relationships that shape and 
reshape them. This is a strong factor constraining  strategies for urban energy transitions. 
The role of metropolitan and local governments in the design and implementation of energy 
transitions at urban scale city is a problematic issue. Most of the literature posits a central role for 
coalitions of metropolitan interests, where local political and business elites partner up with 
experts and various stakeholders in order to design and implement a strategy for an urban energy 
transition. Yet the case of Amman shows that the urban government has very few levers to 
influence change in the energy sector. The case of Amman is instructive in showing that 
connections with global circuits of knowledge and finance are important factors to gaining such 
leverage. However, in the end, they play only a marginal role and urban energy transitions remain 
to a large extent issues which have to be tackled inside the energy sector. Yet this sector is split 
among diverse interests, and the issue of the urban as a place for specific practices which weigh 
upon energy demand is barely tackled. In countries such as Jordan, private energy firms 
specializing in new technologies (energy efficiency, renewable energy) are too small to weigh on 
strategy and they have to rely on foreign partners for large projects (like the wind power or solar 
power plants planned in Jordan (Verdeil, 2011)). 
The case of the ongoing nuclear program illustrates that energy transitions are best understood 
according to a relational understanding of the urban. This is primarily the case regarding the 
geography of the circuits involved in such a project. In the first stage, the urban was not directly 
taken into account. Issues of national independence were the main drivers of such a program. The 
development of mega-infrastructures, needing great amount of energy, was also a major factor 
justifying nuclear generation. The correlation between such infrastructures and the city has long 
remained indirect. The examination of a new site option, motivated by geopolitical pressures and 
concerns for security in the post-Fukushima context, has revealed that the urban is at the core of 
such a national project. National energy authorities are plainly urban too. Yet the example of the 
Jordanian nuclear program is that of an urban energy transition imposed by a coalition of political 
and business interests excluding most metropolitan institutions and groups from the decision 
process. Such a kind of energy transition is probably more common than is assumed in the 
literature. 
The article also helps challenge the view that urban energy transitions necessarily rely on low 
carbon technologies. The case of Amman shows the potential for rebundled networks and for 
exploiting renewable energies, specifically solar. Yet such technologies represent only a very 
limited part of Amman's energy future. The energy transition mainly consists of securing new 
hydrocarbon supplies – including developing a very "dirty" energy like oil shale. The nuclear is 
also an option in the urban energy transition. The possible use of the urban waste waters to cool 
the nuclear power plant would be a paradoxical and uncommon case of rebundled urban 
metabolism. This shows that analyses of the urban energy transitions must not overlook these 
classical sources of energy. 
The case study has also brought conclusions about the social and political dimensions of urban 
energy transitions, which can otherwise be understood as a technological and market-driven issue. 
In contrast to that view, the views of several critical urban scientists were followed, who insist on 
the politics of socio-technical changes and call for an assessment of the social interests involved 
in such processes, and the identification of winners and losers. In this respect I have attempted to 
unravel coalitions of social interests pushing for diverse and, in some ways, contradictory paths 
towards an energy transition. Though one can depict them as neoliberal assemblages cutting 
through various administrative levels and blurring the public-private border, the research process 
reveals internal conflicts of business interests behind the ideological stances against or for the 
nuclear option. The environmentalist movement is highly connected with the emerging alternative 
energy private sector. 
Yet the politics of the energy transitions is not only about business interests, it also touches the 
living conditions of citizens and might be the driver of dynamic street mobilizations where 
specific claims like energy tariffs gain wider political meaning. In Amman, this has been the 
result of the connection between the protests against the new urban location of the nuclear 
program with the more global political claim against the regime in the context of the Arab revolts. 
Particular claims have been expressed in more general political terms of transparency and 
democracy. This is an ongoing process, and at this stage it is still too early to draw conclusions 
about the disruptive political impact of energy transitions. Whatever the future may hold these 
facts highlight that energy transition processes are fundamentally political and highly unruly. 
They cannot be led from the top-down in accommodating elite social interests, but also must take 
into account the interests of citizens. 
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